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INTRODUCTION
Litigation to collect consumer debts has come under scrutiny by federal and
state agencies and rulemakers, as well as by consumer advocates. Some practices,
such as using affidavits with characteristics of robo-signing, or bringing suits on
stale debt, are becoming increasingly well-documented. Indeed, attorneys
general of at least four states have commenced enforcement actions addressing
widespread misconduct in connection with consumer collection litigations.
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1. See generally Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court:
Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 259 (2011) (discussing
individual courts' treatment of robo-signed affidavits and advocating use of strict proof standards);
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Dead Soul is a Debt-Collector, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2010), online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970204204004576049902142690400.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Boom in
Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom-in Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB l0001424052702304510704575562212919179410.html.
2. E.g., Agreed Final Judgment, Tex. v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 2011-40626 (165th Dist. Ct.,
Harris County, Tex. Dec. 21, 2011), available with registration at http://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/edocs/
public/ViewFilePage.aspx?Get= zHhfiEYO3v 1 pzJpZADfLnrxieTe70/S4kKaBU8f/gWa9UYOJbrlbc
BpnBjEfx2HvTQ9KVzoqL +q3LMPPnO7UFf7 1 QUfgcSc/KwtYkp92VCOzM54UlXiWe5Tvn9n2EIp
Y44+jrlOWnig=; Andrew Tangel & Alejandro Lazo, California Sues JPMorgan Over Debt Collec-
tion Tactics, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/businessla-fi-harris-jpmorgan-
20130510,0,624352.story (reporting that California's attorney general filed suit alleging that JPMorgan
used a strategy to "blitz California courts" with lawsuits based on incomplete information, which was
"rubber-stamped by low-level employees'); Jonathan D. Glater, N.Y Claims Collectors of Debt Used
Fraud, N.Y. TIMEs (July 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/business/23cuomo.html?_r= 1
(reporting that New York's attorney general filed suit to vacate thousands of default judgments entered in
collection cases); Press Release, Office of the Minn. Att'y Gen., Attorney General Lori Swanson Charges
One of the Nation's Largest "Debt Buyers" with Defrauding Minnesota Courts and Citizens by Filing
"Robo-Signed" Affidavits (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/pressrelease/
11 0328debtbuyers.asp.
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Such attention is welcome, but it does not change the fact that records of such
litigation and the resulting judgments are public records that are routinely
collected by consumer reporting agencies and used to calculate credit scores.
Consumer reporting agencies have a heightened duty to insure the accuracy of
public records used in consumer reports for employment purposes.? Unfortu-
nately, that duty does not extend to consumer reports used for other matters. The
appearance of a bankruptcy filing, collection suit, or judgment in a credit file can
mean a reduction in a credit score of as much as 150 points, adversely affecting
the consumer's eligibility for future credit, insurance, employment, and housing.4
Although consumers have the right to dispute information contained in their
credit files, consumers who choose to exercise that right face a number of
obstacles.
Some obstacles may arise from the structure and language of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA)5 itself. For example, although the FCRA limits the
reporting of a "civil suit" to seven years from the date of filing, it permits the
reporting of a paid judgment entered in that same suit for up to seven years after
the judgment is filed.6 Time restrictions on the reporting of unpaid judgments, as
well as paid and unpaid tax liens, may be more difficult to determine.7 Moreover,
some courts consider public records to be reliable,8 and protect reporting
agencies from liability for reporting them, even when the records are incomplete
or confusing.9
In addition, common preclusion doctrines and other procedural rules designed
to protect the finality of judgments may limit consumers' access to the courts
to challenge credit reports containing unfavorable collection judgments. For
example, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which generally prevents federal district
courts from reviewing state court judgments, has been used to bar FCRA claims
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1681k (2006) (CRAs must notify consumer regarding use of potentially negative
information or maintain "strict procedures" to insure public records are "complete and up to date").
4. See Sarah Davies, Vantage Score Solutions, LLC, Introduction to the Vantage Score Model: Ways
Consumer Credit Scores are Impacted and Methods for Score Improvement (2012) at 13, http://
money.umd.edulfiles/12_Davies.pdf (discussing the negative impact of various events on a person's
credit Vantage score); see also Les Christie, How Foreclosure Affects Your Credit Score, CNNMoNEY
(Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/22/real_estate/foreclosurecreditscore
(reporting average drops in FICO credit score from the reports of negative information).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006 & Supp. 2011).
6. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE wrrH THE FAIR CREDrr REPORTING Acr 56 (2011)
[hereinafter 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/07/110720fcrareport.
pdf.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011); see CHI Cm Wu & ELIZABEM DEARMOND, NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDrr REPORTING 201 (7th ed. 2010); Danshera Cords, Lien on Me: Virtual
Debtors Prisons, the Practical Effects of Tax Liens and Proposals for Reform, 49 U. LouIsvni L. REV.
341, 360-62 (2011).
8. See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that consumer reporting
agency cannot be liable for reporting inaccurate information obtained from a public record absent prior
notice of the inaccuracy).
9. Wu & DEARMoND, supra note 7, at 141.
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regarding allegations that unfair debt collection practices were employed to
obtain a state court judgment.'o
This Article explores the impact that some of the contemporary practices in
consumer debt collection litigation may have on credit reporting and scoring. In
doing so, it will pay particular attention to available data regarding the use of
unfair collection practices in such litigation, and will consider whether consumer
reports of such litigation unfairly burden consumers' ability to obtain future
housing, employment, insurance, or credit.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief discussion of the mechanics of
consumer reporting and the statutory framework the FCRA provides. The
discussion will draw heavily from three recent reports regarding the industry: the
Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) 2012 report on its ongoing study of credit
reporting accuracy," the FTC's 2011 report summarizing its staff interpretations
of the FCRA,12 and a 2012 report regarding key features of the FCRA published
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).13 Part I will pay particular
attention to the practices and obligations of consumer reporting agencies in
connection with the reporting of information collected from public records.
Part II will examine some of the data collected from recent studies of collection
practices,14 including data contained in a 2013 report by the FTC on the debt
buying industry.15 Part III will consider what this data means for consumers
wishing to challenge reports containing public records resulting from consumer
debt collection litigation. It will also highlight some of the obstacles consumers
face at the intersection of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)16 and
the FCRA. Finally, Part IV will consider several alternatives to relieve some of
10. See Ellis v. CAC Fin. Corp., 6 F. App'x 765 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Laychock v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg., 399 F. App'x 716, 718-19 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that Rooker-Feldman barred FCRA
claims in federal suit seeking damages in connection with alleged wrongful foreclosure).
11. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND ACCURATE
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 (2012) [hereinafter ACCURACY STUDY], available at http://ftc.gov/os/
2013/02/130211 factareport.pdf.
12. See 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, supra note 6, at 56.
13. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, KEY DIMENSIONS AND PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CREDIT REPORTING
SYSTEM: A REVIEW OF How THE NATION'S LARGEST CREDIT BUREAUS MANAGE CONSUMER DATA (2012)
[hereinafter KEY DIMENSIONS], available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb-credit-
reporting-white-paper.pdf.
14. See LEGAL AID Soc'Y ET AL., DEBT DECEPTION: How DEBT BUYERS ABUSE THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO
PREY ON LOWER-INCOME NEW YORKERS 1, 9 (2010) [hereinafter DEBT DECEPTION], available at
http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/cdp_24mayl0.pdf (finding 94.3% of cases brought by debt
buyers in New York Civil Court resulted in default judgments); Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt
Collection Crisis? Some Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 355
(2012); Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation
on Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 257, 296 (2011) (finding 39.46% of collection cases
commenced by debt buyers in Dallas County resulted in default judgments).
15. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY (2013)
[hereinafter DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006 & Supp. 2011).
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the burden on consumers who were subjected to abusive collection tactics in
litigation.
I. CREDIT REPORTING AND ITS REGULATION UNDER THE FCRA
A. The Process of Credit Reporting
Modem credit reporting plays an increasingly important role in consumers'
lives. Three national consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) maintain files on more
than 200 million Americans 17 in what has recently been described as a highly
automated, multi-billion dollar "ecosystem."' 8 This system also includes numer-
ous smaller CRAs and their subscribers, who may be resellers of information or
other users of the reports, as well as private and public fumishers of information,
which include creditors, retailers, employers, and collection agencies as well as
consumers.' 9 Credit reports, and scores generated with information contained in
them, are used by lenders to make decisions about whether to grant credit, and at
what price it will be offered. 2 0 Reports and scores are also used by insurers and
others who engage in risk-based pricing, as well as by employers and landlords,
to make decisions about consumers' eligibility for employment, insurance, and
housing, all of which can have lasting, and often expensive, consequences on the
consumers involved.2 1
The FRCA was originally enacted in 1970 to protect consumers in this process
by promoting accuracy, fairness, and efficiency in the collection, reporting, and
use of sensitive consumer information. 22 It accomplishes these goals by regu-
lating the content of consumer reports, the procedures used to gather information
contained in them, and the conduct of parties distributing, obtaining, and using
them.23
A general understanding of the consumer reporting process is helpful to
understanding the application of the FCRA, which is discussed in more detail
below. In short, the process begins with the delivery of information to the CRAs
from large financial institutions, debt buyers, and others who are known as
17. Equifax Information Services LLC (Equifax), TransUnion LLC (TransUnion) and Experian
Information Solutions Inc. (Experian). See AccuRAcY STUDY, supra note 11, at 2; KEY DIMENSIONS, supra
note 13, at 2-3.
18. See KEY DIMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 6-7.
19. See AccuRAcY STUDY, supra note 11, at 2-3.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 5-6; DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at iv (noting distinction between credit
reports and other consumer reports governed by the FCRA); KEY DIMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 6 & n.a.
22. See 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, supra note 6, at 1.
23. See generally KEY DIMENSIONs, supra note 13, at 6. The statutory name of these reports is
"consumer reports," which are defined as "written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be
used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's
eligibility for" credit, insurance, or employment. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
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"furnishers." 24 Information relating to credit cards, mortgages, auto loans, and
other consumer loans and accounts is reported as "trade lines."2 5 Furnishers
transmit the information electronically in a standard format and update it
regularly. 2 6
In addition to trade line information, CRAs also obtain information from
collection agencies regarding accounts placed for collection and public records
regarding bankruptcies, civil judgments, and tax liens.27 Unlike the trade line
information, which is supplied by a variety of sources, most public record
information comes to CRAs from a single private entity, LexisNexis Risk Data
Retrieval Services LLC (LNRDRS). 28 LNRDRS gathers federal court informa-
tion, including bankruptcy information, from PACER, the court's electronic case
29management system. It also provides state and local court information and
other records from as many as 12,000 different government offices.3 o
Because record-keeping policies and practices vary from state-to-state, the
Fourth Circuit's description of one CRA's process of collecting records from the
250 civil and district courts in Virginia is illustrative.3 ' The Supreme Court of
Virginia operates a shared case management system with clerks of local courts
using a uniform system for recording judgments.3 2 The system displays only the
most recent disposition in each case without displaying the prior history. If a
judgment is vacated after it is recorded, the system no longer records the
judgment and instead records only that the disposition was vacated. According
to the Fourth Circuit, one national CRA, Equifax, "never" directly collects public
records information,34 but uses LNRDRS, which uses independent contractors to
conduct in-person interviews in all of the 120 circuit courts. In some courts, the
contractors may review paper records; in others, they may use the court's
computer and case management system; and in others, they may obtain only a
weekly summary of the dockets. LNRDRS' methods to obtain records from the
state's district courts varied over the years from a bulk feed system, to a
"webscrape" program, to in-person collection.
LNRDRS reports that it obtains and reports approximately 30% of the
information electronically, and the remaining 70% from independent contractors
who gather the information manually and enter it into an electronic form for
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
25. See KEY DIMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 8.
26. See id. at 14.
27. See id. at 8; AccuRAcY STUDY, supra note 11, at 3.
28. See id. at 17.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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LNRDRS, which in turn delivers it to the CRAs.3 The CRAs then compile the
information they receive from private furnishers and LNRDRS before organizing
it in consumer files through a matching process.3 From those files, they generate
the consumer reports for creditors, employers, insurers, and others known as
"users."38
B. Regulating the Content of the Credit Reports
One of the primary ways in which the FCRA protects consumers' private
financial information is by regulating the content of reports. For example,
section 605 limits the types of information that may be included in a consumer
report and the length of time such information may be reported.3 9 Public records
such as civil suits, civil judgments, and records of arrest can be reported for no
more than seven years "or until the governing statute of limitations has expired,
whichever is the longer period."40 There is, however, no requirement that the
litigation be closed prior to reporting.4 Similarly, tax liens paid more than seven
years prior to the consumer report may not be reported, although bankruptcy
cases may be reported for up to ten years.4 2
Although section 605 is drafted in terms of what may not be included, other
provisions require that consumer-reports must contain certain items. For example,
section 605A requires a consumer reporting agency to include a "fraud alert"
upon request of a consumer or a consumer representative who believes she has
been the victim of fraud or other crime such as identity theft.4 3 Likewise, upon
the request of an "active duty military consumer," reporting agencies must
include "an active duty alert" in the consumer's file." CRAs are also required to
include notices when the consumer voluntarily closes a credit account or disputes
information appearing on the report.4 Separate provisions of the Act govern the
consumer dispute process and will be discussed in more detail in Part I.D below,
after first discussing the standards that apply to collection and communication of
information contained in a consumer report.
36. See KEY DIMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 17.
37. See id. at 22-23.
38. See id. at 13 fig.2 (chart explaining flow of information through consumer reporting system).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2006 & Supp. 2011).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1c(a)(2). The governing statute of limitations may permit reporting of an unpaid
civil judgment obtained in a state court for as long as twenty years. See, e.g., TEx. CIV. PRAc. & REM.
CODE § 34.001 (West Supp. 2012) (providing that writs of execution may become dormant after ten years
but may be valid for a total of twenty years if proper steps are taken).
41. See Zahran v. TransUnion Corp., No. Civ. 01C1700, 2003 WL 1733561, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,
2003).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1); see Cords, supra note 7, at 341 (highlighting problems in uniform
reporting of tax liens).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-l(a)(1).
44. Id. § 1681c-l(c)(1).
45. Id. § 1681s-2(a)(3), (4) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
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C. "Maximum Possible Accuracy"
Consumer reporting agencies must "follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy" of the information contained in the report.4 The
massive volume of information flowing through the system presents a number of
challenges to CRAs, which take steps to insure that accurate data is ap-
propriately attributed to the correct consumer.47 For example, national CRAs
routinely screen new furnishers and closely scrutinize data they furnish to
prevent against fraud or other improprieties with the data.48 Then they take steps
to insure that the data is matched to the appropriate consumers. 49 Similarities in
names and other identifying information present additional challenges.so
An agency's procedures are generally considered reasonable when the
information reported is accurate.5 1 It is generally reasonable for a consumer re-
porting agency to rely on the accuracy of information contained in public records.
Indeed, at least one court has held that even when the information obtained from
the public record turns out to be inaccurate, the CRA is protected from liability
when reporting it "as a matter of law." 52
In contrast, "strict procedures" are required to insure that adverse public record
information is current as of the date of reporting when the report is to be used for
employment purposes.5 3 CRAs must also verify adverse public information
contained in an investigative report within 30 days of furnishing it.54 Still, only
"reasonable procedures" are required when reporting public records information
for other purposes. 5 Whether accurate records can nevertheless be misleading,
such as when they are incomplete, is an open question in some jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, inaccuracies occur. The FTC reports that 26% of those who
participated in its accuracy study found at least one material error. 7 Material
errors are errors in categories that are used to generate a credit score, e.g., trade
lines, collections and public records. The majority of material errors identified
46. Id. § 1681e(b) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
47. See KEY DIMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 21.
48. Id.
49. See AccuRAcY STUDY, supra note 11, at 2-3.
50. See KEY DIMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 21.
51. See generally McPhee v. Chilton Corp., 468 F. Supp. 494 (D. Conn. 1978); Austin v. BankAmerica
Serv. Corp., 419 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
52. E.g., Henson v. CSC Credit Services, 29 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1994).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(2).
54. Id. § 168 1d(d)(3) (2006).
55. See id. § 1681i.
56. Compare Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that technically
accurate information may also be misleading in such a way to trigger inquiry regarding reasonableness of
procedures used by agency) with Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
plaintiff must establish inaccuracy of information before examining reasonableness of procedures).
57. ACCURACY STUDY, supra note 11, at i.
58. See id. at 12, 17-18.
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occurred in trade lines and collections.59
In May 2012, the Columbus Dispatch published a multi-part series regarding
errors in consumer credit reporting.60 After reviewing nearly 30,000 complaints
filed with the FTC over thirty months, reporters found that almost a quarter of
them related to errors in reporting credit card, car loan, or mortgage debt. Other
complaints arose from errors in reporting when information regarding one
consumer was mixed with or linked to information relating to another consumer
because of similarities in name, age, or other identifying information.6 1 Other
reported errors related to incorrect personal information about the consumer,
such as name, date of birth, address, or other identifying information.62 Among
the more troublesome errors consumers found in their credit reports related to
court judgments, which are among those the FTC may consider material.6 3
There are a number of ways in which errors can occur in reporting public
record information. They can occur at the source, such as when a court clerk
mistakenly records a dismissal as a judgment for a landlord or when a vendor
mistakenly interprets the content of a public record. 4 Errors can also be made by
the CRA when it fails to update public records in a timely fashion,6 5 or when it
improperly mixes or merges files containing information of persons other than
the consumer.6 6 Although public records disputes may occur less frequently than
other types of disputes, they not only may occur with greater frequency among
certain groups of consumers, but also may adversely affect credit scores more
severely than other types of errors.6
59. See id. at iv, 51.
60. Jill Riepenhoff & Mike Wagner, Dispatch Investigation-Credit Scars: Bad Judgments, COLUM-
Bus DISPATCH (May 9, 2012), www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/05/09/bad-judgments.html
[hereinafter Bad Judgments]; Jill Riepenhoff & Mike Wagner, Dispatch Investigation-Credit Scars,
COLUMBus DISPATCH (May 6, 2012), www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/05/06/credit-scars.
html [hereinafter Credit Scars].
61. Credit Scars, supra note 60.
62. Id.
63. See AccuRAcY STuDY, supra note 11, at 17-18.
64. E.g., Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008).
65. See Soutter v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 3:1Ocvl07, 2011 WL 1226025, at *1-3 (E.D. Va.
2011) (granting class certification to persons whose credit reports continued to show unpaid judgments
more than 30 days after such judgments were "satisfied, appealed, or vacated"), rev'd on other grounds
No. 11-1564, 2012 WL 5992207, at *1-2 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2012) (holding that class plaintiff failed to
satisfy "typicality" requirement). Other problems associated with public records involve multiple
reporting of a single event, as when a creditor continues to report a delinquent account after it obtains a
judgment regarding it or fails to adequately identify the parties to lawsuit. See Robert Avery, Paul Calem,
Glenn Canner & Raphael Bostic, Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, FED. RES. BuLL. 71
(2003).
66. Wu & DEARMOND, supra note 7, at 121-24.
67. See ACCURACY STUDY, supra note 11, at 61-62 (noting that non-white and older participants
displayed more derogatory public records than other participants in the study).
68. See Davies, supra note 4, at 13; Christie, supra note 4.
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D. Consumer Disputes and the Duty to Reinvestigate
Although a reasonable standard applies to protect CRAs from liability
regarding public records at the initial collection stage, the FCRA imposes ad-
ditional obligations on CRAs once a consumer disputes the information. In
these circumstances, the FCRA requires CRAs to conduct a "reasonable re-
investigation" of the disputed information or delete the item from the file. 70 When
the consumer disputes the accuracy of information to the CRA, the CRA must
contact the furnisher who is also obligated to investigate the dispute. In some
circumstances, the furnisher of information may be liable to the consumer for
supplying false or misleading information, although it is doubtful that such
liability could be imposed on a public entity supplying the information.
Courts examining CRAs' procedures for reinvestigation appear to apply a
more rigorous standard than the one associated with the original report.73 As a
result, CRAs failing to carry out the reasonable reinvestigation of disputed
information-even information obtained from a public record-may be subject
to liability for negligent and willful conduct.7 4 Yet, despite these standards, the
practices actually employed by the CRAs in handling consumer disputes may
resemble more of a rubber stamp than a reinvestigation.
The dispute process is operated through e-OSCAR, an electronic system
owned by four major consumer reporting agencies and operated by the Consumer
Data Industry Association (CDIA), which also serves as a trade association for
consumer reporting agencies nationwide. Employing a highly mechanized
process that translates detailed consumer disputes into two- or three-digit codes,
the CRAs resolve some disputes internally; when they do not, they transfer the
codes to the furnishers who may verify the trade line as accurate, modify it as
requested by the consumer, or delete it because of fraud.77 Although the CFPB
reports that about 60% of accounts are modified in some way following a dispute,
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.
70. Id. § 168 1i(a)(1)(A) (2006 &,Supp. 2011).
71. Id. § 168 1i(a)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (requiring CRA to notify furnisher after receiving notice
of consumer dispute); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (generally requiring furnisher to
conduct investigation after notice from CRA and to report its results).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(l)(A)-(D) (2006 & Supp. 2011). See generally Hammond v. Citibank,
N.A., No. 2:10-CV-1071, 2011 WL 4484416, at *5, *13 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2011) (holding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not a bar to claims related to using robo-signed affidavits, but dismissing
FCRA claims because consumer failed to satisfy procedural hurdles regarding dispute).
73. For example, CRAs cannot simply rely on the original source for its reinvestigation where the
consumer has provided information that might undermine the source's credibility. See, e.g., Pinner v.
Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir. 1986).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2006) (negligent noncompliance); 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006 & Supp. 2011)
(willful noncompliance).
75. See Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice: How a Mechanized Dispute System Frustrates Consumers
Seeking to Fix Errors in Their Credit Reports, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 139, 163-65 (2010).
76. See KEY DIMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 31.
77. See id. at 31-32.
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it cautions that is impossible to determine a causal effect because many furnishers
automatically update accounts or trade lines with the most recent information
available upon receipt of a dispute.7 " The FTC found that only 36.9% of disputed
accounts were modified and resulted in a score change. Indeed, there is some
evidence that CRAs do little more than transmit a coded dispute to furnishers
who simply verify the existence of the account without any independent review.so
Because CRAs generally receive public record information from LNRDRS
and not the original source of the records, the CRAs transmit the coded dispute to
LNRDRS for review.8' Upon receipt of the dispute, LNRDRS sends a "data
collector" to the original source who reports back to LNRDRS that the status of
the record is either: (1) unchanged from the original; (2) updated; or (3) unable
to verify.8 2 Neither LNRDRS nor the data collector examines the underlying
public record to verify its content or the appropriateness of its connection to the
consumer.83
Before examining some of the particular problems consumers have in disputes
regarding accuracy and completeness of public records, this Article will consider
the creation of one category of public records-court records regarding litigation
to collect consumer debts.
II. DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION
Just as the economic downturn led to an upsurge in the number of foreclosures
and bankruptcies, it also led to an increase in the amount of debt collection
litigation.84 An Indiana study estimated that the number of civil collection cases
increased more than 50% between 2005 and 2009.85 In 2008, all "suits on debt"
amounted to 78% of the civil cases filed in Dallas County8 6 and just over 72% of
78. See id. at 33.
79. See AccuRAcY STUDY, supra note 11, at 40.
80. 40 Million Mistakes: Is Your Credit Report Accurate? (James Jacoby & Michael Karzis, 60
Minutes, CBS News Feb. 10, 2013), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57567957/
40-million-mistakes-is-your-credit-report-accurate/; Wu, supra note 75, at 161-66. At least one nCRA
maintains that once it conveys the consumer dispute to the furnisher through the e-OSCAR, it not only
satisfies its obligation to use a reasonable procedure to insure maximum possible accuracy, but also
satisfies its obligations for reinvestigation. See Burke v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 2011 WL
1085874, at *n.4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2011).
81. See KEY DUMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 35.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom-in Lawsuits,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI000142405270230451070457556
2212919179410.html; Andrew Martin, Automated Debt-Collection Lawsuits Engulf Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(July 12,2010), http://www.nytimes.comi/2010/07/13/business/13collection.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
85. Fox, supra note 14, at 369.
86. See Spector, supra note 14, at 273 & n.95 (explaining that the term "suits on debt" is a broad
category of debt cases that includes consumer collection cases among others).
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the 2007 civil cases in the state of Kansas. In the few jurisdictions that dif-
ferentiate between commercial and consumer collection cases, it is estimated that
consumer collection cases account for somewhere between 40% to 95% of civil
cases filed.88 In New York City Civil Courts, it is estimated that nearly 300,000
consumer collection cases-approximately 50% of the total-were filed each
year between 2006 and 2008 and more than 240,000 were filed in 2009.89 This
Part examines available data regarding collection litigation and suggests that
issues relating to the litigation may hold consequences long after the case is
closed.
A. Outcomes in Collection Litigation
1. Default Judgments
Conventional wisdom is that most consumer collection litigation results in the
collectors' favor.90 In some jurisdictions, that is true. For example, in New York
City one estimate is that debt buyers won nearly 95% of the cases they filed, a
majority of which were closed with a default judgment.91 Data collected from
other courts indicate a range in default judgment rates from a low of 39% in
Dallas County, Texas, 9 2 to 45% in Cook County, Illinois, 93 to 61% in Indiana.94
Generally, a defendant's failure to respond to the lawsuit after proper service
triggers the default judgment.9 5 Industry representatives attribute default judg-
ments to conscious decisions by consumers who may wish to avoid additional
expenses associated with contesting a debt they acknowledge is due.9 This
narrative of the "deadbeat" debtor may be true in some cases, but it is not true for
87. See id. at 278-79.
88. Ameet Sachdev, Debt Collectors Pushing to Get Their Day in Court, CHI. TRIB. (June 8, 2008),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-06-08/news/0806080066_I_debt-collectors-court-papers-
pushing.
89. DEBT DECEPTION, supra note 14, at 6 & n.57 (2006-2009 figures); see TASK FORCE TO EXPAND
ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT To THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 16
(2010), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLS-TaskForceREPORT.
pdf (reporting 2009 numbers); JANET RAY KALSON & ROBERT MARTIN, N.Y.C. BAR Ass'N, REPORT BY
THE CIVIL COURT AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITTEES IN SuPPoRT OF INTRO. 0660-2007, at 1 (2009),
available at www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/ConsumerDebt.pdf.
90. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-748, CREDIT CARDS: FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT COULD BETrER REFLECT THE EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE AND
USE OF TECHNOLOGY 7 (2009) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d09748.pdf; THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SER. No. NCJ
207388, CONTRACT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 2 (2005), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctvlc0l.pdf.
91. DEBT DECEPTION, supra note 14, at 1.
92. See Spector, supra note 14, at 296.
93. GAO REPORT, supra note 90, at 41.
94. Fox, supra note 14, at 377.
95. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 55.
96. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT
COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 7 (2010) (noting that industry representatives attribute low
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all consumers." Some may choose not to appear because they mistakenly believe
there can be no legal consequences if the account is not theirs, or if they have no
income to satisfy a judgment.98 A landmark study in the 1960s indicated that a
sizeable number of consumers failed to appear in collection litigation because of
a mistaken belief that an agreement with the creditor or its attorney finally
resolved the matter and discontinued the court proceedings. 99 That is what
happened to Anne Vitale, an Ohio lawyer, who was served with a collection case
for a debt that was not hers.' Ms. Vitale contacted the plaintiff's attorney, who
ultimately agreed that the debt was not hers. Ms. Vitale believed the matter to be
closed, until she discovered the entry of a default judgment on her credit report
nearly two years later.' 0 '
A default judgment may also be entered without the defendant's knowledge
that she has been sued, after what is colloquially known as "sewer service." 0 2
Indeed, the occurrence rate of default judgments under such circumstances was
so high in New York City that the Administrative Office of the New York City
Civil Courts issued a number of directives designed to ensure the integrity of
the judgments issued by the court.103 In 2009, New York's Attorney General
commenced criminal actions against collectors and those they employed as a
result of misconduct in connection with service of debt collection cases." More
recently, a federal court certified a class of New York consumers against whom
default judgments were entered between the years of 2006 and 2010.105
In some jurisdictions, default judgments may be entered after notice and
appearance when, for example, a defendant fails to respond in a timely fashion to
consumer participation in collection litigation to consumers' awareness of futility of dispute), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf.
97. See DAVID CAPLOVrrZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 205 (1974).
98. See Fox, supra note 14, at 355-57 (discussing the story of one client who came to clinic for help
after being served petitions in two lawsuits to collect consumer debt).
99. CAPLOvnrz, supra note 97, at 205.
100. See Bad Judgments, supra note 60.
101. Id. Similar facts were the basis of the plaintiffs' claims of unfair collection practices in
McCammon v. Bibler, Newman & Reynolds, P.A., 493 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1168 (D. Kan. 2007).
102. See Fox, supra note 14, at 376 n.134.
103. Civ. Ct. of N.Y.C., Chief Clerk's Memorandum CCM- 186A, Default Judgments and Time Barred
Debt in Consumer Credit Actions (June 1, 2010), available at www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/SSI/directives/
CCM/CCM I 86A.pdf; Civ. Ct. of N.Y.C., Chief Clerk's Memorandum CCM- 186, Default Judgments and
Time Barred Debt in Consumer Credit Actions (May 13, 2009), available at www.nycourts.gov/courts/
nyc/SSI/directives/CCM/CCMl86.pdf; Civ. Ct. of N.Y.C., Advisory Notice AN-9, Consumer Debt
Cases: CPLR § 3015(e); Validation; Allocutions of Stipulations (June 21, 2008), available at www.
nycourts.gov/courts/nyclSSI/directives/AN/consumerdebt.pdf; Civ. Ct. of N.Y.C., Chief Clerk's Memo-
randum CCM-176, Additional Notice on Consumer Credit Actions (Apr. 1, 2008), available at
www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/SSI/directives/CCM/CCM 176.pdf.
104. Glater, supra note 2.
105. Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., 285 F.R.D. 279, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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discovery or to appear for a mediation or other pre-trial setting.' Still others
may be attributable to the defendant's belief that the plaintiff has the wrong
person or to the defendant's inexperience with the court system."o7
Customs and practices may also differ across jurisdictions, resulting in
differing treatment of otherwise similar situations. For example, in some juris-
dictions a defendant's handwritten letter to a judge may be accorded sufficient
legal significance to constitute an appearance that prevents the entry of a default
judgment. 08 In another, a communication that does not comply with the rules of
procedure might be given no legal effect, resulting in a default judgment.'"
2. Other Forms of Disposition
Although default judgments may be the most common way collection cases
are resolved, the Dallas County study found-somewhat surprisingly-that most
cases were resolved by a dismissal without prejudice to re-filing. 0 Of the cases
in which the plaintiffs accomplished service on the consumer defendant, 51.25%
were dismissed without a final adjudication."' In cases in which the consumer
appeared, the dismissal rate jumped to 57.8%.12 And in cases in which an
attorney appeared on the consumer's behalf, dismissals occurred in 72.7% of the
cases.113
There are a number of conclusions that could be drawn about the meaning
of these numbers. One is that dismissal occurs after payment or another
negotiated resolution of the dispute. 1' 4 Another, more nefarious conclusion, is
that the higher rate of dismissal that occurs after the defendant's appearance, with
or without counsel, is caused by the collectors' lack of evidence. As a result,
when the collector faces the possibility of actually litigating the case, it may
106. Among the cases examined in connection with the study of collection litigation discussed in
Spector, supra note 14, were several in which "default judgments" were entered after the defendant
appeared, but prior to the case being called for trial (on file with author).
107. See CAPLOVrZ, supra note 97, at 7-8, 53, 205 (discussing factors contributing to high rates of
default); Fox, supra note 14, at 355 (describing circumstances surrounding consumer's request for legal
services); see also Hilliard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has
the System Failed?, 67 DENv. U. L. REv. 357, 359 (1990).
108. See Spector, supra note 14, at 288 (discussing defendants' appearances in Dallas County).
Additional data obtained in the Dallas litigation study, but not discussed in Spector, supra note 14, is on
file with the author.
109. See Fox, supra note 14, at 382.




114. Indeed, close examination of the Dallas County files that are the subject of the Dallas study in
Spector, supra note 14, revealed that six of the cases in which the disposition occurred without prejudice
revealed that the parties reached an agreement. There was no indication that an attorney assisted the
defendants in the negotiation of these agreements, a factor which likely would have led to the inclusion of
provisions prohibiting the parties from further litigation on the merits.
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choose to dismiss rather than to litigate, a practice some courts have found may
amount to an unfair collection practice."'
Courts have begun to examine judgments obtained by debt collectors, whether
obtained by default or otherwise, to determine whether they result from unfair
collection practices used in the litigation process."' 6 Two principal areas of
concern are discussed in the following section: suits on stale debts and suits
without credible, legitimate, evidence to support the underlying claim.
B. Judgments Resulting from Unfair Collection Practices
1. Suits on Stale Debt
Limitations on suits to enforce contracts or collect debts vary from state to
state. In some states, statutes of limitations are self-executing and prevent the
commencement of litigation to enforce a time-barred debt.' '" In other states, a
statute of limitations may be used only as a defense and may be waived if not
timely raised."' The FTC takes the position that even suggesting that a stale
debt can be enforced in court is a violation of the FDCPA. In January 2012, it
announced a $2.5 million settlement with one of the nation's largest debt buyers,
which required the company, Asset Acceptance Corp., to notify consumers that it
would not sue for time-barred debt. The settlement also required the company to
notify consumers before reporting debts to CRAs." 9
Clearly, if filing or threatening to file a time-barred suit is an unfair practice, a
judgment obtained on time-barred debt is also tainted.12 0 However, in those states
where limitations may be used only defensively, judgments entered on time-
115. E.g., Kuria v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 752 F.Supp.2d 1293 (N. D. Ga. 2010); see Wood
v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-2703-KOB, 2013 WL 360146, at *1, 5 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2013)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment where there was evidence of a strategy and policy of
"scattershot litigation" designed to coerce consumers into paying a debt not owed or to receive a judg-
ment against them); Webb v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-2920-KOB, 2013 WL 360151 (N.D.
Ala. Jan. 29, 2013). But see Bandy v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 12-00491-KD-C, 2013 WL 210730
(S.D. Ala. Jan. 18, 2013) (dismissing for failure to state a claim where the basis of plaintiff's claim was an
allegation regarding defendant's intention to pursue litigation).
116. See, e.g., Nikkel v. Wakefield & Assocs., Inc., No. 10-cv-02411-PAB-CBC, 2011 WL 4479109
(D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2011).
117. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-70-115(1), (4) (2013) (making it unlawful for a debt collector to file
suit on a debt that is barred by limitations).
118. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 94 (requiring a defendant to "set forth affirmatively ... statute of limi-
tations ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense"); TEx. R. Civ. P. 90
(establishing waiver when defects are not raised in writing before judgment). But see Naranjo v.
Universal Sur. Co., 679 F Supp. 2d 787 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (denying summary judgment on FDCPAclaims
where the underlying allegation was a judgment on a stale claim).
119. Under FTC Settlement, Debt Buyer Agrees to Pay $2.5 Million for Alleged Consumer Deception,
FED. TRADE COMM'N (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/01/asset.shtm.
120. See Naranjo v. Universal Sur. Co., 679 F. Supp. 2d 787, 795 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that the
plaintiff stated a claim for unfair collection practices on the basis of collector's conduct in obtaining and
attempting to enforce judgment based on debt it knew was time-barred).
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barred debts are more than a theoretical possibility. Even if the age of the debt
does not put it outside the state's statute of limitation, it may be difficult to verify
an older debt, causing proof problems in litigation. 12 1
2. Lack of Evidence of Underlying Debt and Use of Robo-Signing
The FTC's recent study of nine major debt buyers established that fewer than
50% acquire the name of the original creditor, fewer than 40% obtain information
regarding finance charges and fees, and just 35% obtain information regarding
the date of the plaintiff's default. 12 2 Contractual terms between the debt seller and
debt buyer may further restrict the debt buyer from providing information
regarding the underlying debt to the consumer.12 3 Moreover, the older the debt is,
the less likely the debt buyer will have accurate information about the underlying
debt and who owns it. 124 While this may present problems for collectors' ability
to comply with the verification requirements under the FDCPA,12 5 the lack of
accurate information about the underlying debt presents even greater problems
for consumers in litigation.
Statistics from the Dallas County study indicate that more than 95% of cases
filed by debt buyers failed to include evidence of any of the principal features of
the debt, whether or not they acquired the information when they purchased the
debt.12 6 In January 2012, a state judge in New York sanctioned a debt collector
for engaging in frivolous litigation after obtaining a judgment absent evidence
that it was entitled to collect the debt it sued to enforce.127 Even more troubling is
the use of affidavits that suggests an effort to manufacture evidence to support a
claim where no legitimate evidence may exist, a practice that has come to be
known as "robo-signing."l 28 In 2011, the Attorney General of the State of Texas
settled a lawsuit with one debt buyer after alleging it used false affidavits in
thousands of cases to mislead the courts into entering default judgments.12 9 In
121. DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 44-49.
122. Id. at 34-35.
123. Id. at 26.
124. Id. at 42.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2006).
126. Spector, supra note 14, at 291-92. See DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 35 (finding that
only 30% of debt buyers in the study acquired information concerning interest rate charged on accounts).
127. Midland Funding LLC v. Wallace, No. 1788-08, slip op., 2012 WL 29074, at *4-5 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
Jan. 5, 2012).
128. See DEBT DECEPTION, supra note 14, at 14, 27 n. 102; Ben Schott, Robo-Signers, SCHOTT'S VOCAB
(Oct. 6, 2010, 10:00 am), http://schott.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/robo-signers/ (defining "robo-
signers" as a "nickname for those who processed large numbers of foreclosure affidavits); David Segal,
Debt Collectors Face a Hazard: Writer's Cramp, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 31, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/11/01/business/01debt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
129. See Plaintiff's Original Petition and Application for Temporary and Permanent Injunction, Tex. v.
Midland Funding LLC, No. 2011-40626, (165th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. July 8, 2011); Agreed Final
Judgment, Tex. v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 2011-40626, (165th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Dec. 28,
2011), available with registration at http://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/edocs/publiclViewFilePage.aspx?
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September 2012, a federal judge certified a class of consumers who claimed a
lack of credible, admissible evidence had been used to obtain judgments against
them in state court.13 0
Ill. CHALLENGES FOR CONSUMERS: WHERE THE FCRA INTERSECTS THE FDCPA
The story of Anne Vitale, the Ohio lawyer who learned about a default
judgment entered against her two years after the fact when she tried to borrow
money to purchase a home, is situated at the crossroads where the FCRA
intersects the FDCPA. For Anne Vitale, intervention by an attorney from the
Attorney General's office was needed to help navigate a path out of danger.131
For others, like Jason Dennis,' 3 2 who challenged a report of long-settled
landlord-tenant litigation, or Donna Soutter,133 who challenged a report of an
erroneous judgment that was later vacated, the filing of a lawsuit may be
necessary,134 although its outcome may be uncertain.
Consumers initiating such lawsuits over reporting public records face a
number of challenges that can leave them feeling like they've suffered the effects
of a one-two punch. The first punch comes from inconsistent standards courts
apply to determine the accuracy of public records. Part H.A examines the
applications of these standards and finds that whether the court considers the
information "technically accurate," or sufficiently incomplete or misleading
to trigger an agency's duties under section 611 to reinvestigate, may also depend
on the application of complex state or local rules governing the record-
keeping. Part LH.B examines the second punch. It comes from inconsistent
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which some courts have held
deprives them of jurisdiction to consider FCRA challenges to reports of state
court judgments.
A. The First Punch: Determining Accuracy of Public Records Under the FCRA
As discussed in Part I above, section 607 requires a CRA to "follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning
the individual about whom the report relates."' 35 In general, -an agency's
procedures are considered reasonable-and not subject to scrutiny under section
Get= zHhfiEYO3v lpzJpZADfLnrxieTe70/S4kKaBU8f/gWa9UYOJbrl bcBpnBjEfx2HvTQ9KVzoqL
+q3LMPPnO7UFf7lQUfgcSc/KwtYkp92VCOzM54UlXiWe5Tvn9n2EIpY44+jrlOWnig=.
130. Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., 285 F.R.D. 279, 282-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
131. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
132. Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008).
133. Soutter v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 11-1564, 2012 WL 5992207, at *1-2 (4th Cir. Dec. 3,
2012).
134. See Bad Judgments, supra note 60 ("Consumers faced with inaccuracies that they can't erase
essentially have two options: live with it or file a lawsuit.").
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
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611-unless the consumer makes a prima facie case that reported information is
inaccurate.' 3 6 In a minority of jurisdictions, an agency's conduct is considered
reasonable under section 607 even when the consumer proves that "technically
accurate" information is also incomplete or misleading.' 3 7 In those jurisdictions,
incomplete or misleading reports are also insufficient to trigger a reasonable
investigation under section 611, much less the stricter standards required under
section 613 when public records are reported for employment purposes.' 38
The majority approach, articulated in Kouropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 39
considers the likelihood that reported information, although "technically accu-
rate" can also be incomplete or misleading.14 0 Nevertheless, whether or not
public records are accurate may rest on interpretations of state law or a plaintiff's
technical compliance with pleading rules imposed on the FCRA's statutory
dispute system. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Henson v. CSC Credit
Services,14 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC,14 2 provide
examples.
In Henson, plaintiff challenged a consumer report indicating that he owed a
money judgment.14 3 The court examined the contents of the clerk's docket entry
regarding the judgment and found it incorrectly applied to the plaintiff despite the
fact that the court had "rendered" judgment against a co-defendant only.'"
Despite the inaccuracy, the court held that the CRA could not be liable under
section 607 as "a matter of law .. . for reporting inaccurate information obtained
from a court's Judgment Docket, absent prior notice from the consumer that the
information may be inaccurate."l45
Lack of liability under section 607 did not, however, necessarily protect a CRA
from liability under section 611.146 The court held that once the consumer
satisfied its burden of providing the CRA with notice of a potential inaccuracy of
a public record, section 611 would require the CRA to conduct an investigation
that might involve more than simply verifying accuracy of the original source.14 7
136. See Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1069 (finding that 15 U.S.C 1681e and 1681i require prima facie
showing of inaccuracy).
137. Wu & DEARMOND, supra note 7, at 111-12.
138. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
139. Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that technically
accurate information may also be misleading in such a way to trigger inquiry regarding reasonableness of
procedures used by agency).
140. Id.; see also Valentine v. First Advantage Saferent, Inc., 2009 WL 4349694, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
2009).
141. 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1994).
142. 520 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2008).
143. 29 F.3d at 283.
144. Id. at 282.
145. Id. at 285.
146. Id. at 286-87.
147. Id. The court cited Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1986), in which the Fifth Circuit
held that the CRA acted unreasonably under section 611 when its only effort at investigation was to
contact the employee of the creditor with whom the consumer claimed to have a dispute.
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Whether or not the investigation would be reasonable under the circumstances is
then left to the trier of fact.148
As in Henson, the Dennis court considered a state court clerk's inaccurate
record of the disposition of a case.' 49 In 2002, after Dennis' landlord sued him for
unlawful detainer, Dennis agreed to pay nearly $3000 in exchange for an
agreement that no judgment would be entered against him. The parties filed a
written stipulation with the court. Unfortunately, however, a clerk inaccurately
recorded the stipulation as "Court Trial Concluded-Judgment Entered."' 50 Two
months later, after Dennis paid the agreed amount, the court's record accurately
reflected that a dismissal disposed of the lawsuit.'
Experian subsequently prepared a credit report containing the erroneous initial
entry on the court's docket, that a "Civil Claim judgment" had been entered
against Dennis.15 2 After Dennis exercised his rights under the FCRA and
disputed the report, Experian hired a third-party vendor to investigate. The
vendor obtained a copy of the written stipulation from the court that confirmed
Dennis' claim, but apparently did not read or understand its meaning because the
vendor told Experian that the original report was correct. Apparently relying
solely on the information from the vendor, Experian informed Dennis that its
report was accurate and refused to make any changes. 5 3
Like the plaintiff in Henson, Dennis asserted a claim under section 607 and a
claim under section 611 for the failure to conduct a "reasonable reinvestigation to
determine if the disputed information is accurate."l5 On the first issue, the court
determined that the report of a "judgment" was inaccurate because, contrary to
the court's records, the parties agreed that no judgment was entered.'55 Although,
the court refused to hold Experian strictly liable for the error, it returned the
case for trial on the issue of the reasonableness of the procedures used in its
initial report of the information.' 5 6 The court noted that at trial Experian would
be free to argue the reasonableness of its procedures, including the issue of the
reasonableness of relying on a court's records, even though they were inaccu-
rate. 157
However, just as in Henson, the Dennis court held that once the consumer
provided such notice to a CRA, section 611 imposed an independent obligation to
conduct a reasonable reinvestigation.'5 ' Reasonable procedures sufficient to
148. 29 F.3d at 287.
149. 520 F.3d at 1069.




154. Dennis also asserted a number of claims under state law. Id.
155. 520 F.3d at 1070.
156. Id. at 1069-70.
157. Id.
158. Henson, 29 F3d at 285-96; Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1070.
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satisfy the CRA's obligations under section 607 would not insulate it from
liability under section 611; simply verifying the existence of the erroneous
information was not enough to satisfy its obligations. 15 9 The court held that to
satisfy that obligation, the CRA must examine court records with "reasonable
diligence" and found that overlooking documents in the court file expressly
supporting the consumer's assertions, "falls far short of this standard."'6 As a
result, more than six years after the state court made an erroneous entry on its
docket, the Dennis court, on its own motion, held that Experian acted negligently
in fulfilling the duty of reasonable reinvestigation under section 611.61
Although Dennis appears to represent a victory for consumers by imposing a
stricter standard of reasonableness under section 611 than exists under section
607, any widespread benefits for consumers may be elusive so long as courts
apply a "technical accuracy" standard to the underlying report. Indeed, such an
approach is contrary to the plain language of section 611, which requires a
reinvestigation "if the completeness or accuracy of any item of information
contained in a consumer's file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the
consumer."1 6 2 By limiting the consumer's right to require a reinvestigation under
section 611, courts deprive consumers of the ability to insist that CRAs consider
additional information to avoid an incomplete or misleading result.16 3
The harsh effects of this approach can be seen in Haro v. Shilo Inn, in which an
Oregon federal court granted a CRA's motion for summary judgment in
connection with a report obtained for employment purposes.'" The report
included the record of a dismissal of a charge that the plaintiff had failed to
register as a sex offender.165 The plaintiff asserted a claim under section 607
alleging that the CRA failed to maintain reasonable procedures by failing to
report the reason for the dismissal-that the entire case had been a matter of
mistaken identity. He also asserted a claim under section 613 which required
either the use of "strict procedures" or prior notice when adverse public record
information is used in a report for employment purposes.16 6
Although the existence of the charge and its subsequent dismissal could not be
disputed, the court reasoned that, because the plaintiff "failed to contest the
accuracy of the information reported,"-i.e., that the charge was dismissed-he
could not make the "prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting" necessary to
159. 520 F.3d at 1070-71.
160. Id.
161. The court held that a fact question nevertheless remained on the issue of whether the conduct was
willful. Id. at 1071.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
163. See Wu & DEARMOND, supra note 7, at 111-14 (noting also that this approach fails to weed out
unverifiable information appearing on a consumer's report).
164. 2009 WL 2252105, (D. Or. Jul 27, 2009).
165. Id.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1681k.
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trigger the credit reporting agency's duty to reinvestigate under section 611.167
The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims under section 613 on the same
ground, despite the different standards the statute imposes in employment
situations and despite the nature of the reported information and the likelihood it
could, and did, adversely impact the plaintiff's employment.16 8
An Arkansas federal district court applied similar reasoning in Taylor v. Tenant
Tracker Inc. holding.16 9 It held that records of convictions of an unknown third
party appearing on the plaintiff's credit report were "technically accurate" even
though they did not relate to the plaintiff,'o a result that ignores the plain
language of section 607(b) requiring the accuracy of information "concerning the
individual about whom the report relates."' 7 ' Bound by precedent, the Taylor
court noted similarities with Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc.,172 in which a
district court granted the CRA's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
technical accuracy of the records relating to prior eviction activity involving
persons other than the plaintiff precluded an inquiry into the reasonableness of
the procedures used to gather and report them.'7 3 On appeal, a panel of the Eighth
Circuit reversed and adopted the more nuanced balancing approach articulated in
Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc. 174 It weighed the potentially misleading nature
of the reported information-e.g., mistaken reports regarding the consumer's
prior eviction or criminal activity-against the availability of more complete or
accurate information and the burdens placed on credit reporting agencies for
acquiring it.' 7 5 Ultimately, the panel decision in Wilson was vacated and a split
decision en banc had the effect of reinstating the district court's dismissal of the
case using the technical accuracy test.'7 6
Acknowledging the unfairness of such a decision, the Taylor court was
nevertheless bound by Wilson and granted the agency's motion for summary
judgment under section 611 holding that the duty of reinvestigation could not be
triggered by a "record .. . devoid of any evidence suggesting that the report
itself-of someone other than the plaintiff-was 'technically inaccurate."" 77
167. Id. at *3. Contra Houston v. TRW Information Servs, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding that a credit report of a state court judgment two years after it had been vacated was inaccurate).
168. Haro v. Shilo Inn, 2009 WL 2252105 at *3; see supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text
(discussing requirements for reporting public record information in connection for employment
purposes).
169. No.4: 10CV00282 BSM, 2011 WL 5402388 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 4, 2011).
170. Id. at *4.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
172. Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying balancing test to
reverse grant of summary judgment for the defendant), vacated on rehearing en banc, 206 F.3d 810
(8th Cir. 2000) (resulting in reinstatement of district court's order granting summary judgment on
technical accuracy standard).
173. Taylor, 2011 WL 5402388 at *3.
174. Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.1984).
175. See Wilson, 165 F.3d. at 646-47 (citing Koropoulos, 734 F. 2d at 42).
176. Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 206 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2000).
177. Taylor, 2011 WL 5402388 at *4.
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Fortunately, a majority of courts reject this approach.'
A reasonable person might think that a report of being "involved with" a scam,
means something other than a report that someone is a "victim" of a scam. 179
Courts recognizing that the additional information provided in the second clause
makes the first clause misleading, reject the "technical accuracy" standard. 80
They adopt the approach first articulated in Koropoulos,'s' which is also con-
sistent with the language and intent of the statute.18 2 The balancing test requires
more than simply transmitting information provided by a furnisher or vendor of
public records once the consumer provides the CRA with notice of the error. The
more misleading the information or the greater the degree of harm it causes (and
the degree of effort needed to correct it), the greater the responsibility of the CRA
to correctly report it.' 8 3
Despite the widespread applicability of this approach, CRAs are resistant to it.
Sandra Cortez's five-year struggle with TransUnion is an example that was
featured in a recent investigative report regarding credit-reporting errors.18 4 It is
also the subject of Cortez v. TransUnion, LLC, a Third Circuit case in which the
court unequivocally rejected TransUnion's argument that it acted reasonably in
simply transmitting correct information about a person other than the person who
was the subject of the report.' 8 5
Sandra Jean Cortez's problems began with a credit report TransUnion sent to a
Colorado car dealership with whom she was negotiating.' 86 Prior to visiting the
dealership, Cortez, who was born in Chicago in 1944 and had never traveled
outside of the country, checked her TransUnion credit report.' 8 7 She did not find
any significant adverse information and learned that her credit score was
considered high, about 760."' The report TransUnion sent in response to the
dealership included the correct identification and credit information that Cortez
had obtained, but it also contained a "Hawk Alert" which indicated "a match"
with a person by the name of "Cortes, Sandra Quintero."18 9 Sandra Quintero
178. Id.; see, e.g., Cortez v. TransUnion, LLC, 617 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2010) (report containing
government alert that person with name similar to plaintiff's was on government list of persons believed
to be threats to security); Price v. TransUnion, L.L.C., 839 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding
CRA's conduct unreasonable where plaintiff put CRA on notice multiple times, over multiple years that
accounts placed on her report were not hers).
179. See Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986).
180. E.g., id.
181. 734 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
182. See Wu & DEARMOND, supra note 7, at 111-13 & 2012 Supp. at 40-41.
183. See Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
184. See Jill Riepenhoff & Mike Wagner, Dispatch Investigation-Credit Scars: Car-buyer flagged as
Terwrist, COLUMBUs DISPATCH (May 9, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/05/07/
car-buyer-flagged-as-terrorist.html [hereinafter Flagged as Terrorist].
185. See 617 F.3d 688, 708-11 (3d Cir. 2010).
186. Id. at 696.
187. Id. at 697.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 699.
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Cortes, born in 1971, was identified as a person whose name appeared on a
Treasury Department list of persons considered to be a threat to the national
security or economy and with whom American citizens were prohibited from
doing business.'90
The dealership's finance manager insisted that Cortez remain at the dealership
while he investigated the report.'91 After more than six hours during which
Cortez confirmed her birthdate and previous addresses, she was allowed to leave
and purchase the car she had chosen, but not until the dealership concluded that
she was not the person who against whom the security alert had been issued.19 2
Over the course of the next several weeks, Cortez contacted TransUnion
several times, by phone and in writing, to have the "match" removed from her
credit report.' 93 After several weeks, Cortez received a form letter from
TransUnion indicating that its records showed that the disputed alert did not
currently appear on her credit report. She then visited the dealership for
confirmation, requesting it order a new report from TransUnion.19 4 It did so and
provided her with a copy. Although it did not contain the phrase "Hawk Alert," it
contained a "High Risk Fraud Alert," which also referred to the Treasury
Department's watch list.'95 Cortez visited government websites to learn more
information about the list and continued to try to correct the report with
TransUnion, but more than a year later, a report ordered by a landlord indicated
that she was a "match" with someone on the Treasury Department's list.' 96
Eventually, Cortez filed suit and a jury found that 1) TransUnion negligently
failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in
producing Cortez's credit report and 2) that it willfully failed to reasonably
investigate her dispute and correct it on subsequent reports.' 9 7 On appeal,
TransUnion argued that its credit report was accurate because it "simply included
the information furnished by the government" and that by indicating a "match," it
indicated only a "possible match" rather than an "exact match." 9 8 The court
rejected this argument and refused to draw any meaningful distinction between
information CRAs obtain from government records and information obtained
from any other source.199 In both circumstances, the court explained, the CRA
"collects such information .... summarizes it, and reports it to those who will
190. Id. at 696-97. The court discusses the "patchwork" of legal authority relating to the list of persons
known as "Specially Designated Nationals" maintained by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC's SDN list). Id. at 698-99, 701-03. In short, American citizens and businesses are
prohibited from doing business with persons identified on OFAC's SDN list. Id. at 697.
191. Id. at 697-98.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 699.
194. Id. at 700-01.
195. Id.at701.
196. Id. at 700-01.
197. Id. at 705.
198. Id. at 709.
199. Id.
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subsequently rely on the resulting reports in making consumer credit deci-
19200
sion.
The court then turned to TransUnion's responsibilities under section 611 and
affirmed the jury's determination that TransUnion failed to reasonably reinvesti-
gate Cortez's dispute, and that it failed to note the existence of the dispute in her
file. It found TransUnion's argument that it had no ability to change the list to be
"disingenuous at best," especially in light of testimony at trial that it was the
company's policy to investigate disputes regarding the government list only after
the consumer sued.2 01
Sandra Cortez ultimately prevailed. The court held TransUnion responsible for
reporting erroneous information purporting to come from a public record as well
as for the failure to adequately investigate it.2 0 2 As difficult as the dispute was for
Sandra Cortez, consumers disputing a consumer report containing information
about collection litigation they believe is the result of unfair practices may face
additional hurdles. Indeed, as discussed below, they may find themselves without
a forum in which to hear their dispute.
B. The Second Punch: Rooker-Feldman
A judicial doctrine known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally prevents
federal courts from looking behind state court judgments and has been used to bar
a consumer's inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the entry of a state court
judgment, even where the consumer alleges that unfair debt collection practices
were employed to obtain it.203
The doctrine takes its name from a pair of Supreme Court cases decided more
than sixty years apart. The first is Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.2 0 4 The plaintiffs
filed suit in federal district court to set aside a decision of the Indiana Supreme
Court on the ground that enforcement of the Indiana statute that was the subject
of the case would violate the contract and due process clauses of the Con-
205 Tedsr
stitution. The district court dismissed the suit, and in a direct appeal the
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that
the relief sought by the plaintiff would serve to invalidate an otherwise valid state
court judgment. Construing the applicable statutes governing jurisdiction of the
federal courts, the Court found that federal review of state court judgments was
200. Id. at 7 10.
201. Id. at 713-715.
202. Id. at714.
203. See Laychock v. Wells Fargo Home Mort., 399 Fed. App'x 716, 718-19 (3d Cir. 2010);
Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2002); Ellis v. CAC Financial Corp., 6 Fed. App'x
765, 769-70 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. Gordon & Wong Law Group, P.C. 681 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (E.D.
Cal. 2010).
204. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
205. Id. at 149-50.
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available only by direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court.2 06
The second case is District of Colum. Ct. of App. v. Feldman,2 07 in which
plaintiffs sought waivers from the D.C. Court of Appeals to sit for D.C. bar
examination. The court of appeals, which served as the highest court within the
jurisdiction and the entity responsible for licensing lawyers, denied their
requests. Plaintiffs filed separate suits in federal district court challenging the
court of appeals' decisions as unconstitutionally denying them equal protection
under the law and both sought orders permitting them to sit for the bar
examination.20 8
The district court dismissed both cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
on the ground that the decision to deny the waivers was a "judicial act," over
which it did not have jurisdictional authority. The district court reasoned that if it
were to accept jurisdiction and grant the relief sought, it would be setting aside
the decision of the District of Columbia's highest court, something it was not able
to do. 2 09 The appellate court reversed on the ground that the decision to deny the
waivers was administrative, not judicial, and could properly be considered by the
federal district court.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court, reversed and remanded the
case to the district court. He agreed that the disposition of the requests for the
waivers was a judicial act, not an administrative one. Because the plaintiffs
sought relief in the form of an injunction that would have the effect of setting
aside that decision, their claims were "inextricably intertwined" with the court's
decision and therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the district court.210
However, Justice Brennan also found that the plaintiffs raised other claims that
did not require setting aside the decision. Both cases, he wrote, also raised
general challenges to the constitutionality of state rules governing admission to
the bar that were well within the jurisdiction of district court. Those claims, he
reasoned, were properly before the district court and he remanded for their
consideration.2 11
In 2005, more than twenty years after Feldman, the Supreme Court refined the
doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,212 limiting its ap-
plicability only to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judg-
ments."2 13 The next year, the Court cautioned lower courts to apply the doctrine
206. Id. at 150.
207. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
208. Id. at 468-69.
209. Id. at 470.
210. Id. at 487.
211. Id. at 487-88.
212. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
213. Id. at 284.
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more narrowly.214
After Feldman, courts applied Rooker and Feldman broadly in a wide variety
of cases,2 15 including cases brought by consumers to challenge debt collectors'
use of unfair practices in connection with obtaining or enforcing state court
judgments against them.2 16 For example, in Ellis v. CAC Financial Corp., the
Tenth Circuit applied an expansive approach in holding that although plaintiffs
did not "expressly seek" to overturn an underlying state court judgment, the
district court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims relating to the collector's
conduct in the state litigation, among other things, "improper assignments" and
perjury.217
After Lance, however, federal courts examining challenges to litigation tactics
in collection cases have generally applied Rooker-Feldman more narrowly,
carefully parsing the plaintiff's claims to determine whether the claims arise out
of injuries caused by a state court judgment or out of conduct, although related,
which is nevertheless separate.2 18 Hammond v. Citibank, N.A., is a recent
example. 21 9 Hammond asserted violations of the FDCPA and the FCRA arising
out of a default judgment foreclosing his home mortgage. 2 2 0 He claimed the
judgment was the product of robo-signing. 22' Rejecting defendants' attempt to
conflate plaintiff's claims with the remedy it sought, the Hammond court instead
focused its attention on the "the source of the injury."2 2 2 Because the source of
the injury under the FDCPA and FCRA was defendant's alleged fraudulent
conduct in the litigation, and not the judgment that resulted from the litigation,
the court determined that it had the jurisdiction to consider the claims.2 2 3 Claims
of fraud in procuring the state court judgment were therefore outside the scope of
Rooker-Feldman.2 24
More recently, in Solis v. Client Services, Inc. 225 a district court applied
214. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006).
215. See Dustin E. Buehler, Jurisdiction, Abstention, and Finality: Articulating a Unique Role for the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, 42 STON HALL L. Rav. 553, 561 (2012) (distinguishing between three
doctrines used by federal courts to avoid interference with state court litigation).
216. E.g., Ellis v. CAC Financial Corp., 6 Fed. App'x 765 (2001). See also Dickerson v. Bates, 287 F
Supp. 2d 1251 (D. Kan. 2003) (affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction in case raising, among other
things, claims of fraud in procurement of eviction judgment).
217. Ellis, 6 Fed. App'x at 769.
218. See, e.g., McCammon v. Bibler, Newman & Reynolds, P.A., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Kan.
2007); but see, e.g., Williams v. Cavalry Portfolios Servs., LLC., No. SACV 10-00255 JVS(ANx), 2010
WL 2889656 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2010); Bryant, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1208 (holding that Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred plaintiff's claim "inherently challenging" entry of default judgment and garnishment
order arising from it).
219. No. 2:10-CV-1071, 2011 WL 4484416 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2011).
220. Id. at *1.
221. Id; see also supra note 129 and accompanying text.
222. Hammond, 2011 WL 4484416, at *1.
223. Id. at *6-8.
224. Id. at *4-5.
225. No. 11-23798-CIV, 2013 WL 28377 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2013).
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Rooker-Feldman to to bar only the portion of a plaintiff's claims seeking an order
vacating a default judgment entered by a state court in a credit card collection
case. 2 2 6 However, the court also held that the doctrine did not bar other bar claims
related to defendant's alleged misconduct in the litigation for which there were
independent remedies.2 27
Courts generally agree that Rooker-Feldman permits examination of an
underlying judgment where a plaintiff claims it was procured by fraud, as in
Hammond where the plaintiff provided evidence of fraud in connection with a
robo-signed affidavit. 2 28 However, not all claims relating to misconduct in
collection litigation involve fraud.22 9 Intent, which is an essential element of a
claim for fraud, is unnecessary to most claims under the FDCPA.2 3 0 As a result, a
consumer's FDCPA claim that a judgment was procured with merely unfair,
misleading or deceptive conduct may not be enough to prevent application of
Rooker-Feldman.2 3 1 Indeed, the extent to which Rooker-Feldman continues to




Consumers wishing to dispute credit reports of state court judgments face a
number of challenges that consumers challenging trade line information do not
face. Protection provided to CRAs offers little incentive to improve methods
of collecting and reporting public record information. Some state and local
jurisdictions have already implemented measures to relieve the burdens of
226. Id. at *1.
227. Id. at *4; see also Smith v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 11 C 1814, 2011 WL 2560234 at *2-3
(N.D. Ill. June 28, 2011) (holding that although Rooker-Feldman was not a bar to plaintiff's challenges
regarding a debt collector's conduct, res judicata served the same purpose).
228. E.g., Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A. 434 F3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding claims
regarding filing of false affidavit not barred); Hammond, 2011 WL 4484416, at *14 (holding claims
related to use of robo-signed affidavits not barred, but dismissing FCRA claims because consumer failed
to satisfy procedural hurdles regarding dispute).
229. C.f Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010) (ack-
nowledging that liability for statutory violations can occur absent defendant's specific intent and holding
that defendant's statement in foreclosure litigation could be the basis for liability under FDCPA despite
defendant's good faith mistake regarding law's applicability).
230. See RosERT J. Hones, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., I FAlR DEBT COLLECTION 171-72 (7th ed.
2011) (noting that strict liability is the "general pattern" used by the FDCPA).
231. See, e.g., Bryant, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1208 (applying Rooker-Feldman in absence of fraud
allegations where "net effect" of claims would be to invalidate state court judgment).
232. Compare Cavalry Portfolios Servs., LLC, 2010 WL 2889656 at *5 (holding plaintiff's claims
regarding default judgment were barred) and Kelley v. Med-I Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.
2008) (holding claims of unfair practices in seeking attorneys' fees in state collection cases were barred),
with Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., 434 F3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006) (Rooker-Feldman not a
bar to claims of filing false affidavits) and McCammon v. Bibler, Newman & Reynolds, P.A., 493 F.
Supp. 2d at 1171 (holding claims for injuries resulting from unfair practices rather than judgment not
barred).
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collection litigation on consumers.23 3 For example, in Maryland, rules of pro-
cedure have been revised to enhance the integrity of the underlying collection
litigation and, hopefully, to prevent the entry of judgments procured as a result of
unfair practices.2 34 Policy makers should also consider changes to the FCRA to
provide additional protections. There are a number of alternatives available for
improving the current system of credit reporting to provide fair and accurate
information and to prevent the harm that results from the one-two punch of
reporting litigation that is the result of unfair collection practices. Among them
are the following, which are discussed more fully below:
* Restrictions on type and timing of information reported
* Imposition of more rigorous standards for reporting public records having a
potentially adverse effect on the consumer
* Elimination of the "technical accuracy" test
* Enhancement of CRAs' duty to reinvestigate under section 611
* Limitations on use of default judgments in calculation of credit scores
A. Restrict Type and Timing of Information Reported
Restricting or prohibiting the reporting of certain public records, such as civil
filings until after final disposition, 23 5 or unpaid tax liens2 3 6 would eliminate
much of the hardship faced by consumer/victims of unfair collection practices
when attempting to assert their dispute rights under the FCRA. An example
of a restriction regarding the reporting of certain public records is found in
California's Civil Code section 1785.13, which prevents the reporting of an
eviction case unless the landlord is the prevailing party.2 3 7 This provision might
serve as a model to limit the reporting of other forms of litigation unless the
disposition is unequivocally adverse to the consumer. Doing so would undoubt-
edly prevent inaccuracies caused by subsequent appeals or orders vacating
judgments and reduce the time, effort and expense devoted to attempts to correct
233. See DEBT BUYING INDuSTRY, supra note 15, at 6 & n.30.
234. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-306(a)(3) (West 2012). As noted above, new rules
have also been implemented in the New York City Civil Court. See supra note Ill and accompanying
text.
235. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13 (West 2010).
236. See Cords, supra note 7, at 344 (proposing FCRA be changed to remove unpaid tax liens from
consumer reports seven years after they become unenforceable).
237. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13 ("(3)Unlawful detainer actions, unless the lessor was the prevailing
party. For purposes of this paragraph, the lessor shall be deemed to be the prevailing party only if (A) final
judgment was awarded to the lessor (i) upon entry of the tenant's default, (ii) upon the granting of the
lessor's motion for summary judgment, or (iii) following trial, or (B) the action was resolved by a written
settlement agreement between the parties that states that the unlawful detainer action may be reported. In
any other instance in which the action is resolved by settlement agreement, the lessor shall not be deemed
to be the prevailing party for purposes of this paragraph.").
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reports containing outdated public record information.23 8 It might also serve to
provide relief to consumers who are victims of unfair collection practices
involving the filing of scattershot litigation with no intent to pursue it to trial.2 39
Restrictions on timing, as well as subject matter, might also reduce disputes
regarding reports of judgments later vacated or dismissed on appeal. Requiring
waiting periods of thirty or forty-five days before a CRA may report a court
judgment would serve a similar purpose to California's eviction rules and also
eliminate the need for careful scrutiny of the contents of the records.
B. Expand Existing Requirement Relating to Public Records Having a
Potentially Adverse Effect
Policy makers should consider expanding existing requirements regarding
report of public records that have a potentially adverse effect to cover all types
of reports, not only those used for employment purposes. Congress already
recognized the danger that adverse pubic information can have when used for
employment purposes.2 40 Certainly, the impact that inaccurate public records can
have when used for purposes of determining eligibility for public and private
housing can be just as severe.2 4 1
Expansion of the requirement that "strict procedures" be used in collecting and
communicating public record information might provide the necessary incentive
for CRAs to employ more rigorous matching criteria when preparing reports, or
take additional steps before reporting convictions involving serious crimes or
public records relating to foreclosure. It would also go a long way toward
preventing a lengthy dispute process that often can be resolved only through
litigation. 24 2
C Abolish the "Technical Accuracy" Test
Lawmakers should abolish the "technical accuracy" test. Whether through
regulations implementing the statute, or by amendment to the statute itself,
rejection of the "technical accuracy" test would provide a single, uniform and fair
standard across jurisdictions that would allow courts to avoid absurd results. By
enabling consumers to challenge the incomplete or misleading, but otherwise
accurate reports, lawmakers might also provide incentives for CRAs to achieve
the "maximum possible accuracy" required by the statute.2 4 3
238. See supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text (discussing Dennis case and its origin in a 2002
court error, not finally decided until 2008).
239. See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
240. 15 U.S.C. § 1681k (West 1998).
241. See supra notes 165-69, 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing Ham, Taylor, and Wilson).
242. See supra notes 172-74, 185-203 and accompanying text (discussing Cortez and Wilson).
243. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
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D. Enhance CRAs'Duty to Reinvestigate under Section 611
Lawmakers should consider enhancing CRAs' duty to reinvestigate dispute
claims, and provide clear guidance regarding the steps necessary to accomplish
that duty. For example, certain additional steps might be required when re-
investigating adverse public records, especially where the record being reinvesti-
gated involves serious criminal offenses or conduct involving moral turpitude.
For example, insuring the complete disposition of some arrests might avoid
problems like those at the heart of the Haro case.2" Similarly, requiring en-
hanced verification or matching procedures might avoid reports that a con-
sumer's name "matches" the name of a third party on a government watch list. 24 5
E. Limit Use of Default Judgments in Calculation of Credit Scores
Even if lawmakers choose not to limit the reports of certain types of records 246
they should encourage credit scoring entities to reduce the weight attached to
default judgments of any kind, particularly ones entered in collection cases.
Unlike, a judgment entered after a trial on the merits, the legal or preclusive effect
of a default judgment may be difficult to determine.247 Widespread reports of
unfair practices and fraud in the procurement of those default judgments provide
additional reasons to question their reliability. Whether the value assigned to
default judgments is reduced or completely eliminated, CRAs and credit scoring
entities must properly account for their unique nature to adequately protect
consumers.
V. CONCLUSION
The intersection of the FDCPA and the FCRA can be dangerous for consumers.
Contemporary practices in consumer debt collection litigation have resulted in
large numbers of default judgments, many of which are the product of deceptive,
unfair, misleading and fraudulent practices. These judgments are public records
that are routinely reported on consumers' credit reports, and which can have a
significant adverse effect on a consumer's eligibility for credit, housing, in-
surance and employment. This Article has highlighted the primary obstacles
consumers face when challenging a report of a default judgment. In doing so, it
has also suggested some strategies for improving the reporting of public records
and relieving some of the difficulties consumers face. The strategies suggested
are not a cure-all, however, but rather a starting point for further discussion,
research, and action.
244. See supra notes 165-69, and accompanying text.
245. Cf Cortez, 617 F.3d at 697-98.
246. See supra notes 233-37, and accompanying text.
247. See generally 18A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4442 (2d ed. 1987).
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